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Abstract. The fate of Marxism in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies as the former’s extension owing 
to post-WWII occupation was from the beginning sealed by Bolshevism, that is, the politico-ideological 
domination and use of the scholarly domain as well, made to self-close in a merely justifi catory role. There may 
have been attempts at opening, even if only conceivable within–i.e. preserving at the same time–this framework 
function. In the present conspectus, the limiting positions are occupied by the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic, completed by after-1968 Czechoslovakia, as well as Yugoslavia and pre-1968 
Czechoslovakia, representing the substitute-to-religion dogmatic side, exclusively politically motivated in the 
former and subordinated to a humanising tendency in the latter case, on the one hand, and Poland, dedicated to a 
purely analytical approach, in which Marxism has simply no relevance, on the other. Hungary, treated in an earlier 
paper by the author, was in-between, taking Marxism seriously but mostly as a methodology, and thereby able to 
foster live debates. All that notwithstanding, there has been quite a few progressive moves also in Romania and 
Bulgaria in this specifi c academic fi eld. Turning topoi of the discussions were, chronologically but recurrent 
transubstantiatedly, the exclusivity of Vyshinsky’s socialist normativism, the consequences ensuing from the law’s 
superstructural nature, the discontinuity vs. continuity of law in historical development, and, in the background, 
the dilemma of the ontological/epistemological understanding of Marxism, the latter standing for a rigid Leninist 
reducibility of law to its material substratum as the product of sheer refl ection, and the former enabling to develop 
the law’s relative autonomy as in Lukács’ posthumous ontology. On the fi nal analysis, all these forced paths made 
a whole region’s efforts to be belated as compared to international developments, the fact notwithstanding those 
outstanding achievements were born especially on the fi elds of legal ontology and sociology, as well as the legal 
methodology and particularly that of the comparison of laws.
Keywords: Marxism, Vyshinsky, socialist normativism, legal theory, legal sociology, comparative law, Leninist 
theory of refl ection, relationship to western legal philosophies
Preliminaries
In the Soviet Union, it was Andrey Vyshinsky and his normativism (made sacrosanct after 
the conclusion of the infamous all-federal “debate” in the Soviet Academy’s Law Institute 
in 1938) that institutionalised Stalin’s regime in the fi eld of law. In addition to suppressing 
all the initiatives born since the 1920s (by having both Stuchka and Pashukanis physically 
liquidated), the regime excluded codifi cation renewals as well, efforts launched by many 
Soviet-Russian civilist lawyers.1
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1 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Codifi cation as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. 2nd {reprint} ed. with Annex 
and Postscript. Budapest, 2011. and <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/varga-
codifi cation-as-a-socio-historical-phenomenon-1991/>. Ch. VIII para. 2, 216 et seq. As a tactic 
concession, after 1941 Stalin took a number of measures, although as mere lip-service, in order to 
increase the chance that war efforts, having started from a weakened position, might transform into an 
all-popular patriotic cause for the defence of the Soviet homeland, thanks to the regime’s temporarily 
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In contrast to all this, in Central and Eastern Europe proper,2 prior to the ideological 
Gleichschaltung carried out in the wake of the Muscovite territorial and political conquest 
after World War II, a variety of local versions was cultivated: neo-Kantianism was discussed 
everywhere in the region (to the West from the Baltic countries and from Bulgaria/Romania, 
in the vast area of German cultural infl uence), complemented by French institutionalism 
and solidarity theory (mostly in the Francophone Balkans). Mention is also to be made of 
the psychological trends (e.g. Leon Petrazycki) mainly in St. Petersburg and the sociological 
theories of Russian scholars formulated in the course of their emigration (e.g. Pitirim A. 
Sorokin and Georges Gurvitch, who once edited an independent Russian journal of 
jurisprudence during their interim period of voluntary exile in Riga).3
Amidst such active professional lives, Budapest could not gain a central role compared, 
for instance, to Brno–with František Weyr and his journal4–, which provided the 
internationally acknowledged second most signifi cant workshop of Hans Kelsen’s Viennese 
normativism. At the same time, however, besides Leon Petrazycki’s foundation of a new 
school after he had returned to Warsaw, Budapest and Szeged in Hungary also worked their 
way up to be equal partners to the Vienna school of positivism.
Stalinism and Post-Stalinism
The world-revolutionary imperial attitude of the Soviet Moloch evoked similar reactions on 
behalf of its Cold War adversaries. As a consequence, Western and Atlantic literature, in a 
way typical of big powers’ politicised attitudes, identifi ed Soviet legal theory with anything 
of Socialism’s Marxism5–practically all along.6
encouraging religious and national sentiments. Meanwhile, however, he rigorously kept basic strategy 
unchanged in view of preventing any concession from spreading over to ideological areas, 
compromising his terroristic rule.
2 For an overall–but sketchy–survey of the entire region, spanning over their whole modern 
period of one the the half centuries, see Varga, Cs.: Philosophy of Law in Central and Eastern Europe: 
A Sketch of History. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 41 (2000), 17–25.
3 Zakon i sud: Vestnik Russkogo iuridicheskogo obshchestva [Statute and court: Review of the 
Russian legal community]. [Riga] I–VIII (1929–1938). [Reprint: Riga, 2000.]
4 Internationale Zeitschrift für die Theorie des Rechts [Brünn], I–XII (1926–1938). Cf. also 
<http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/František_Weyr_(právník)>.
5 With the collection of Varga, Cs. (ed.): Marxian Legal Theory. The International Library of 
Essays in Law and Legal Theory: Schools. Aldershot, etc. and New York, 1993, I attempted a late 
breakthrough.
6 First of all, Aleksandrov, N. G.: Sushchnost’ prava [The essence of law]. Moscow, 1950; 
Sergei Sergeievich Alekseyev–S. S.–Kerimov, D. A.–Nedbailo, P. E.: Metodologitsheskie problemi 
pravovedeniya [The methodological problems of jurisprudence]. Pravovedenie, (1954) 4. 15 et seq. 
and Sheindlin, B. V.: Sushchnost’ sovetskogo prava [The essence of Soviet law]. Leningrad, 1959. As 
a collection, cf. Hazard, J. N. (ed.): Soviet Legal Philosophy. Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy 
Series 5, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951. The Yugoslavian pattern, as exemplifi ed by Lukić, R. D.: Teorija 
drzáve i prava [Theory of state and law]. I–II. Beograd, 1954. [reprint: Beograd, 1995], followed a 
most severly dogmatic path.
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Separation from Vyshinsky’s Theory 
It is illustrative of the force of Soviet homogenisation that Vyshinsky’s so-called Socialist 
normativism,7 a positivist extremity with the underlying doctrine of arbitrary will 
(ideologised as transforming the “objective” necessities of the economic basis into the 
state’s legal superstructure) remained uncriticisable, free from any frontal attack for a long 
period.8 Even after his personal downfall, rather than being verbally contradicted, it was 
only challenged indirectly and sideways, à propos of an apparently peripheral issue, 
formulated in the manner of an offi cious follower’s zealous humility. Notably, it was 
questioned: how much is a norm’s legal quality affected if it would not result in a jural 
relation–no matter how partial the fi eld and exceptional the occurrence is.9 As dams are 
likely to burst at a minor crack or mole-hill, it was such an innocent and marginal query 
into which the until then suppressed dilemmas of the acceptability of judicial law making 
and the legal nature of customary law–along with the justifi ability of a sociological approach 
and the recognition of values as external yardsticks–did in fact stream.10
No one may dare to claim that legal thinking could have taken a different path. Albeit 
there was no expressed political manifestation to force implementation of Vyshinsky’s 
doctrine in Hungary, still the neophytes’ political oversensitivity in making the domestic 
scene harmonised could result in a local variant and nothing else. Only the residue of some 
critical details allowed methodological supplements and additions that were able to build in 
some potential for transcendence in the long run.
7 Following Vyshinsky, A. Y.: Voprosy prava i gosudarstva u K. Marksa [Questions of law and 
state at Marx]. Moscow, 1938, see Vyshinsky, A. Y.: Voprosy teorii gosudarstva i prava [Questions of 
the theory of state and law]. Moscow, 1949. See also Stalgevitsh, A. K.: K voprosu o ponyatii prava 
[To the issue of the notion of law]. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, (1948) 7, 49–63 and Strogovich, 
M. S. et al.: Teoriya gosudarstva i prava [Theory of state and law]. Moscow, 1949.
8 See, e.g. Kelsen, H.: The Communist Theory of Law. New York and London, 1955; Lapenna, 
I.: State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory. London, 1964, and Stoyanovitch, K.: La philosophie 
du droit en U.R.S.S. (1917–1953). Bibliothèque de Philosophie du Droit IV, Paris, 1965.
9 Kechekian, S. F.: Normy prava i pravootnosheniya. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, (1955) 2, 
23–32; Piontkovskiy, A. A.: Nekotorye voprosy obshchei teorii gosudarstva i prava [Some issues of 
the general theory of state and law]. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1956/1, 14–28 as well as 
Stalgevitsh, A. K.: Nekotorye voprosy teorii sotsialisticheskikh pravovykh otnoshenii [Some questions 
relating to socialist legal relationships]. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, (1957) 2, 2 et seq., in criticism 
of which Farber, I. E.: K voprosu o ponyatii prava [To the issue of the notion of law]. Sovetskoe 
gosudarstvo i pravo, (1957) 1, 38–50 proved a rear echelon. See also Kerimow, A. A.–Gläss, H.–
Leymann, J.–Wiese, A.: Über den Begriff des sozialistischen Rechts. Staat und Recht, (1958) 11, 
1150–1154 and Zhogin, N. V.: Vyshinsky’s Distortions in Soviet Legal Theory and Practice. Soviet 
Law and Government, 4 (1965) 2, 48–56.
10 For example Iavich, L. S.: A Contribution to the Question of the Methodology of 
Jurisprudence. Soviet Law and Government, 2 (1963) 2, 11–16 and Strogovich, M. S.: Problems of 
Methodology in Jurisprudence. Soviet Law and Government, 4 (1966) 4, 13–22. The early and 
pioneering achievement by Veingold, Yu. Yu.: Pravo kak sotsiologicheskaya kategoriya [Law as 
sociological category]. Frunze, 1962, remained unheard off and unshared by in its temporary Soviet 
medium.
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From Ideological Self-closing to Apparently Scholarly Opening 
The instances that can be presented for an overview organised by countries representing 
characteristic attitudes11 provide a telling example of switches between extremities.
As to ideologically thoroughly closed societies, a strict functional division prevailed in 
the German Democratic Republic. It separated–both institutionally and bibliographically, 
that is, in view of researchers’ and researches’ profi les, library collections, and the passes 
permitting access thereto–the building of Socialism (allowing nothing but Socialist works 
for inspiration), on the one hand, from the criticism of “Imperialism”, on the other. Only the 
latter justifi ed the study of “bourgeois” literature, and only with the aim of “annihilating” it. 
Accordingly, thinking about Western sources from the end of 19th century (including Max 
Weber, of course) was short-cut by their being castigated as “the enemy”, without the 
chance of being considered as a referential impetus for building Socialism.
In the Soviet Union (where, for a long while, the Hungarian Imre Szabó was the only 
jurist member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences after Vyshinsky’s death in 1953)–anything 
of Western literature being scarce and practically unavailable, and, moreover, regarded as 
irrelevant to progressive thought (the way in which Cyrillic script separates from Latin 
culture)–, no formal division was institutionalised. According to the well-established 
practice, monographs prepared within the confi nes of the Institute of State and Law of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences [Институт государства и права Академии Наук СССР] 
did entail rare historical and contemporary references to Western literature (mostly as 
embellishment, without any serious intention of analysis or debate, and taken from a rather 
meagre choice, merely to subject them to superfi cial rejection by some catchphrases),12 
upon the basis of a Socialist comparative platform (with a mere glance at theory and 
practice in the so-called peoples’ democracies), that is, only to serve as a far-away memento 
of scholarly ideals.
After the intervention in 1968, in Czechoslovakia’s law libraries only sources in Slavic 
languages remained freely available in addition to domestic publications (e.g. even from 
Hungary, mostly titles published in Russian were available).
As to Romania and Bulgaria, no offi cial discrimination was present, since overall 
poverty had already resulted in the practical lack of either Western resources or non-Marxist 
literature. So anything diverting from Balkans-style Socialism could provide additional 
colours at the most, without genuinely expanding the fi eld of topical discussion.13
In fact, it was only Yugoslavia and (especially the Czech and Moravian areas of) pre-
1968 Czechoslovakia that could present a visible exception, with Marxism cultivated by 
11 Cf., as a bibliographical background material, Knapp, V.: La philosophie du droit dans les 
pays Socialistes. In: Klibansky, R. (ed.): Contemporary Philosophy. A Survey. Firenze, 1971. 156–
169.
12 For example Tumanov, V. A.: Contemporary Anti-Marxism and the Theory of Law. Soviet 
Law and Government, 8 (1969) 1, 3–20.
13 Except for some theoretical and critical papers written by A. M. Naschitz with a passion of 
radicalism yet preserving theoretical ambitions all along, e.g. Critica unei »critici« burgheze a teoriei 
marxist–leniniste a statului şi dreptului: cu priviere la lucrările lui H. Kelsen: Teoria politică a 
bolşevismului şi Teoria comunistă a dreptului [Criticism of a bourgeois »critic« on the Marxist–
Leninist theory of state and law]. Studii şi cercetári juridice, (1958) 2, 29–58. and Filozofi a 
existenţialista a dreptului – fi lozofi e a pseudodreptului şi a lichidării legalitătii: In legatura cu lucrarea 
lui G. Cohn: »Existenţialismul şi ştiinţá dreptului« [Existentialist philosophy of law as the philosophy 
of pseudo-law and of the liquidation of legality]. Studii şi cercetári juridice, (1961) 1, 25–54.
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scholarly ambition. However, even this school of thought was not ready for confrontation 
with open-ended competition. Scholars concentrated all their efforts on building up a 
genuinely Marxian theory seen as its renewal (as theoretical pluralism within Marxism was 
accepted there in view of fostering internal debates), as a genuine “renaissance of Marxism”. 
Hence, they needed nothing specifi c besides Western Marxism. In total, however, by 
rejecting external criticism and building from inside exclusively, they proved to be far more 
unyielding and dogmatic than their Soviet forerunners did.14
This is why true openness could be encountered in Poland alone. There, in a successful 
continuation of local tradition as to psychological, logical and analytical directions, 
conceptual analysis was given priority in both social theory and sociology, as well as in 
political science and jurisprudence. As a consequence, Marxism itself as a per defi nitionem 
ideological and policy-oriented approach was excluded from the competing approaches that 
required exactness in cool detachment as a scientifi c ideal. As a perhaps paradoxical after-
effect, theoretical jurisprudence there became increasingly sterile and at the same time 
irrelevant to public debates. Having transformed into a local school or branch of the then 
mainstream Western European and mainly Anglo–American analytical-conceptual 
directions, Polish legal theorising narrowed down, with practically nothing locally timely to 
say–in addition to suffering self-closure in professionalism, being only preoccupied with 
itself. Unlike in Hungary, Polish Communist party rank-and-fi le university staff was often 
the force cultivating legal theory, like conceptual mathematics at a high intellectual level, 
when jurisprudence proper was at stake, and who used Marxism without much critical 
distance when theorising departed from sheer legal conceptuality to arrive at fi elds marked 
by class struggle ideology, especially in the theory of the state. In such a strange symbiosis, 
Marxism could return to becoming overtly predominant, at least in the sense that for issues 
where the subject concerned was manifested as an aspect of power, in a political context, 
or as ideology and/or social practice (e.g. legal policy or law on the state and 
state administration), Marxism still prevailed full-fl edged, all liberal appearances 
notwithstanding.15
14 There were exceptions nevertheless. These included the integral publication of T. Živanović’s 
non-Marxist oeuvre–Sistem sintetičke fi lozofi je prava [The system of a synthetical philosophy of law]. 
I–III. Belgrad, 1922, 1951, 1959–, and, above all, O. Weinberger’s stand of a revolutionising force–
Die Sollsatzproblematik in der modernen Logik. Praha, 1958–which, stirring up huge debates even 
with its repercussions, pointed out that ought-propositions are not cognitive categories and, therefore, 
are not to be characterised by either truth or falsity. By the way, it is just this sensitive issue that 
became the critical test of the Leninian so-called refl ection theory all through the Socialist world. For 
my attempt similar to the one above, rejected in my homeland for reasons of prevailing dogmatism as 
unacceptable from the outset, see Varga, Cs.: A magatartási szabály és az objektív igazság kérdése 
[Rule of behaviour and the question of objective truth] {a collection of papers from 1964 to 1994, 
bound to remain unpublished mostly for political reasons}. [1964] In: Varga, Cs.: Útkeresés: 
Kísérletek – kéziratban [Searching for a path: Unpublished essays]. Jogfi lozófi ák, Budapest, 2001. 
4–18. The query was positively answered–exclusively from the viewpoint of formal logic, by the 
way–by Loeser, F.: Zur Frage der Wahrheit in der Moral. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 9 
(1963) 9, 1104 et seq.
15 This resulted in a practical division of labour according to personal gifts and chosen career 
paths. For instance, in Poland, Z. Ziembinski, A. Podgórecki and J. Wróblewski, as well as K. Opałek 
and M. Borucka-Arctowa rarely abandoned the proper terrain of theoretical or empirical scholarship, 
while the oeuvre of the then-director of the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, A. Łopatka, scarcely treated any genuinely scientifi c problem at all.
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Unfortunately for Hungary,16 the country did not have any comparable social scientifi c 
tradition. A fundamentalist past that had once used axiological approaches in building up 
feasible teleologies was bound to return again. All in all, there were theoretical 
manifestations with diverse stands and approaches (including international trends 
domesticated and alternatively formulated), only to collide both excitingly and edifyingly 
within the all-covering umbrella of Marxism. The play was often on an ideological razor’s 
edge. There is no need to emphasise that this involved risks, but it was usually done in a 
way that carried timely messages for society (even if indecipherably sometimes, when they 
were over-coded by caution).17 Appearing explicitly dramatic at times, it guaranteed both 
the weight and seriousness of theoretical issues with a direct impact upon society, not 
infrequently stirring up wide intellectual circles and public opinion as well.18
From Political Ideology to Genuine Scholarship 
Thereby an exceptional balance could be achieved in Hungary through the parallel 
fulfi lment of expectations representing two extremes in apparent mutual exclusion of one 
another. For in this Soviet world empire, the actual choice ranged from
16 For the overview’s Hungarian part in details, cf. Varga, Cs.: Philosophising on Law under the 
Umbrella of Marxism in Hungary. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 53 (2012), 265–286.
17 In Hungary, it was by no mere chance, therefore, that besides Hegel, Thomas Mann became 
the stylistic ideal, as a prerequisite of survival, for the theoreticians at the Institute for Legal Studies 
of the Academy of Sciences. Thanks to this, censors of the Communist Party central cultural bureau 
(headed by György Aczél and contributed to by, among others, Ildikó Lendvai, later faction leader, 
then president, of the Socialist Party that governed the country for twelve years since the fall of 
Communism in 1990) preferred in fact withdrawing us from their range of actual control to bothering 
with our overcomplicated abstractions. At the same time, for the Institute staff, any participation in 
debates in the public fora of journalism was strictly prohibited, as the only available means of 
corporate self-defence from political control.
18 As to Hungary, research in the law on the state by, e.g. Ottó Bihari and István Kovács, were 
often in the focus of international press interest–true, not without political overtones but still within a 
scientifi c context. Owing to his commitment to modernisation and wide personal reputation in 
sociology, pieces by Kálmán Kulcsár were much sought-after in the broadest intellectual circles. As to 
personal memory, my collection on Jog és fi lozófi a: Antológia a század első felének polgári 
jogelméleti irodalma köréből [Law and philosophy: An anthology of the fi rst half of 20th century 
western legal theories]. Budapest, 1981 with translations of R. Stammler, E. Ehrlich, F. Kantorowicz, 
L. Petrazycki, M. Weber, F. Somló, Fr. Gény, G. del Vecchio, G. Radbruch, H. Kelsen, B. Cardozo, R. 
Pound, J. Frank, K. Olivecrona had aroused nation-wide intellectual interest (relaxing the practically 
absolute isolation of law from topics debated in general public fora at the time). It was only 
subsequently, after the collapse of the regime, that I could gain some idea of how many people, in 
addition to practicing lawyers, studied my legal-philosophical treatment on Lukács–Varga, Cs.: A jog 
helye Lukács György világképében. Gyorsuló Idő, Budapest, 1981, in English, The Place of Law in 
Lukács’ World Concept. [1985] 3rd [reprint] ed. with Postface. Budapest, 2012 and <http://
drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/the-place-of-law-in-lukacs-world-concept-19852012/>.–, 
and mostly without (at least not exclusively) the aim of obtaining par excellence law-related 
knowledge but owing to its widely known intention to use Marxism as a Trojan horse in an eventual 
and latent transcendence of Marxism.
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– a directly ideological and political servicing (characteristic of the East German,19 
Soviet20 and post-1968 Czechoslovakian patterns); via
– the emergence of some reconciliation21 (representing the Romanian22 and Bulgarian 
patterns) and via
– the undivided assumption of some scholarly ethos, yet only in view of, and through, 
the consistent political enforcement of the superiority of the Marxism of Socialism (as in 
the Yugoslavian23 and pre-1968 Czechoslovakian24 patterns); up to
– ensuring scholarly self-development in parallel with preserving ideological 
semblance (characteristic of the Hungarians); and to
– attaining personal (topical or disciplinary) separation of politics from scholarship, 
that is, of legal theory as ideology and, respectively, as conceptual analysis, in addition to 
an empirical sociological description of facts (as in the Polish as well as the pre-1968 Czech 
and Moravian patterns).
19 For example Rechtsbegriff und Rechtsnorm: Internationales Symposium des Instituts für 
Staats- und Rechtstheorie vom 12. bis 14. 5. 1966. in Jena. Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Friedrich-
Schiller-Universität Jena: Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, 15 (1966), 405–476. 
and Gollnick, R.: Internationales Symposium in Jena zum sozialistischen Rechtsbegriff. Staat und 
Recht, (1966) 8, 1336–1345.
20 Nedbailo, P. E.: Primenenie sovetskih pravovykh norm [The application of Soviet legal 
norms]. Moscow, 1960, as the initiation of comparativism, Zivs, S. L.: O metode sravnitelnogo 
issledovaniya v nauka o gosudarstve i prave [On the method of comparative investigations in the 
science of state and law]. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, (1964) 3, 23 et seq.; Kazimirchuk, V. P.: 
Pravo i metody ego izucheniya [Law and the methods of its research]. Moscow, 1965; Babiy, B. M. 
(ed.): Konkretno-sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya v pravovoi nauke [Concrete-sociological research in 
legal science]. Kiev, 1967; Jawitsch, L.: The General Theory of Law: Social and Philosophical 
Problems. Moscow, 1981. Developments are always uneven. For the sake of balance it has to be 
pointed that the Soviet Union was also the scene of both pioneering and progressive initiatives in, e.g. 
launching research on the law’s logical and linguistic aspects and a Marxising re-foundation of legal 
axiologism. See, e.g. in result of the debate on the magisterial book of Drobnitsky, O. G.: Mir 
ozhivskhikh predmetov: Problema tzennost’i i marksistkaya fi losofi ya [The world of revivifi ed objects: 
The problem of value and Marxist philosophy]. Moscow, 1967; Balakhina, I. F.: Problemy tsennost’e 
– vnimanie posledovatelei [The problem of values]. Voprosy fi losofi i, (1965) 9, 153–154.
21 For example Cosmovici, P.: Traits spécifi ques du concept du droit relevés par la science juridique 
de Roumanie. Revue roumaine des sciences sociales: Série de Sciences juridiques, 22 (1978), 51–63.
22 An outstanding example is provided for this by laying the foundations of the way how legal 
technique is to be understood. Cf., by Naschitz, A. M.–Fodor, I.: Rolul practicii judiciare în formarea 
şi perfecţionarea normelor dreptului Socialist [The role of judicial practice in formation and perfection 
of Socialist legal norms]. Bucureşti, 1961, and Conştiinţa juridică Socialistă [Socialist legal 
consciousness]. Bucureşti, 1964, as well as Tehnica legislativă şi metodologia în drept [Legislative 
technique and legal methodology]. Studii şi certetări juridice, 13 (1968) 1, 45–57.
23 For example Lukić, R. D.: Teorija države i prava. II: Teorija prava. Beograd, 1957. 42–47. 
restricted “regulation in a legal form” to cases alone where antagonistic class confl icts were at stake. 
For differing directions, see, e.g. Perić, B.: Pravna znanost i dijalektika: Osnove za suvremenu 
fi lozofi ju prava [Legal knowledge and dialectics: Foundations of contemporary philosophy of law]. 
Zagreb, 1962, and 6. izd. Biblioteka Udžbenici 156, Zagreb, 1990.
24 For example Lakatoš, M.: Otázky tvorby práva v socialistické společnosti [Questions of law-
making in socialist society]. Praha, 1963.
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Remarkably, although the Polish pattern inspired many contemporaries struggling for 
their way on more diffi cult paths25 and impressed them with the promise of safety closed in 
positivism and the ethical quality of the stance eventually taken, its fi nal achievement, 
permeated with the ideal of some “self-interested scholarship”, proved to be of a dubious 
value. For its cultivation consumed its initial energies. Opposed to Muscovitism without 
any social embedment of its own, it withdrew to the status of a specimen of West-inspired 
counter-epigonism, confi ned to peripheral stakelessness.
For, at a time when ambitions to scholarly autonomy were to be appreciated properly, 
debates generated at the price of hard labour under repressed conditions could nevertheless 
lead to individualistic paths beaten successfully–even if contradictorily, but in a way best 
suited to their underlying conditions. “For–as noticed earlier26–, despite being disabled and 
hamstringed, the greatest available variety of trends of thought could evolve in our country 
under the order superimposed on us from above both as a strait-jacket and as a protective 
shield; moreover, there was not one of these designated as a focus from which one had to 
step out and back, in contrast to Hartianism as a compulsory garment in the otherwise most 
liberal Great Britain.”
Just to recall few examples from countries with limited favourable conditions: the locally 
important Romanian programme announcement27 or the Bulgarian and Romanian debates on 
legal continuity28–albeit scarcely transcending the intellectual level of the Hungarian debate a 
decade earlier, i.e. at Stalinism’s peak–were proved defi nitely most inspiring by their impacts 
on their respective environments. Or, the Yugoslav and pre-1968 Czechoslovakian debates 
conducted under the pretext of “humanising” Marxism could eventually only contribute to the 
25 Polish theoretical legal thought in general and Ota Weinberger’s logical-cybernetic path in 
Prague in particular had a rather attractive call in Hungary. It is by no means mere chance that I 
published two dozen review articles on Polish books during that period while I dedicated hardly half a 
dozen reviews to all other Socialist titles. Cf. Varga, Cs.: Jogi elméletek, jogi kultúrák: Kritikák, 
ismertetések a jogfi lozófi a és az összehasonlító jog köréből [Theories and cultures of law: Reviews in 
legal theory and comparative law]. Jogfi lozófi ák, Budapest, 1994.
26 Varga, Cs.: The Hart-phenomenon. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 91 (2005) 92, 
note 46.
27 In fact, Ion Gheorghe Maurer [member of both the National Assembly and the Communist 
Party Central Committee for three decades, then Head of State and Prime Minister for one and a half 
decades, simultaneously with his directorship at the Institute for Legal Research of the Romanian 
Academy of Sciences] outlined–in Maurer, I. G.: Cuvînt înainte [Introductory words]. Studii si 
cercetári juridice, (1956) 1, 1–47.–the foundations of Sovietised Rumanian legal Marxism with thirty 
references to, or quotations from, the French scholarship, which was an act unheard–of in this very 
epoch. In an altered political atmosphere, his successor, Ionascu, Tr.–Dezvoltarea Stiintei juridice 
Socialiste în Republica Populară Romînă [Development of socialist legal sciences in the People’s 
Democracy of Romania]. Revista Romănă de Drept, (1964) 8, 34–56–, could also rely on domestic 
literature alone, without referring to Soviet authors.
28 Cf., primarily, Ionascu, Tr.–Barasch, E. A.: Les constantes du droit: Droit et logique. Revue 
roumaine des sciences sociales: Série de sciences juridiques, 8 (1964) 2, 129–143. and Nenovski, N.: 
Priemstvenostta v pravoto [Continuity in law]. Sofi a, 1975, and Preemstvennost’ v prave [Continuity 
in Law]. Moscow, 1977. For a Western refl ection, see also Tay, A. E.-S.–Kamenka, E.: Marxism–
Leninism and the Heritability of Law. and Münzel, F.: Chinese Thoughts of the Heritability of Law. 
Review of Socialist Law, 6 (1980), 261–291.
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further survival of the hegemony of Marxism.29 Nevertheless, they did open gaps and break 
splits in a monolith such that new trends were introduced and antagonisms revealed, in 
addition to the very fact that debates had occurred, generated in a more or less academic 
manner. Through accumulation, they sowed the seeds of later development.
Otherwise speaking, Polish works–remarkable scholarly achievements–may have 
happened to presume less courage than apparently poor Romanian or Albanian ones. There 
were in fact also monographic accomplishments of standing academic import in East 
Germany, the Soviet Union or Romania. All in all, the Socialist output touched on 
foundational issues of the philosophy and methodology of jurisprudence in general,30 and of 
legal logic,31 cybernetics32 and further key topics33 in particular, in addition to local 
29 It was by no mere chance that the Budapest school of Lukács’ disciples (Ágnes Heller, 
György Márkus, Ferenc Fehér, and so on), media favourites for international leftist progressives of 
the age, joined unconditionally in these trends. In legal theory, this was represented by the new 
dogmatism in Yugoslavia and sporadically cultivated in Czechoslovakia. By contrast, this had no 
professional echo at all in Hungary despite a few accidental references by Vilmos Peschka, who was 
motivated by a moral espousal of a trend offi cially rejected.
30 Opałek, K.: Problemy metodologiczne nauki prawa [Methodological problems of legal 
sciences]. Warszawa, 1962; Peczenik, A.: Wartość naukowa dogmatyki prawa: Práca z zakresu 
porównawczej metodologii nauki prawa [The scientifi c value of legal dogmatics]. Kraków, 1966; 
Nowak, L.: Próba metodologicznej charakterystyki prawoznawstwa [The methodological 
characteristic of legal knowledge]. Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu: Prace Wydziału 
Prawa 38, Poznan, 1968.
31 Grzybowski, St.: Wypowiedz normatywna oraz jej struktúra formalna [Normative expression 
and its formal structure]. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego: Ropzprawy i Studia 
XXXIX, Kraków, 1961; Gregorowicz, J.: Defi nicje w prawie i w nauce prawa [Defi nitions in law and 
in the science of law]. Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe: Wydział I/52, Łódz, 1962; Perelman, Ch. 
(ed.): Études de logique juridique. III: Contributions polonaises à la théorie du droit et de 
l’interprétation juridique. Travaux de Centre National de Recherches de Logique, Bruxelles, 1969; 
Grahn, W.: Die Rechtsnorm: Eine Studie. Methodologie der marxistisch–leninistischen 
Rechtswissenschaft 6, Leipzig, 1979.
32 As a forerunner, see, e.g. Andreev, N. D.–Kerimov, D. A.: O vozmozhnostiyakh kibernetiki pri 
reshenii pravovykh problem [On the potential use of cybernetics in solving legal problems]. Voprosy 
fi losofi i, (1960) 7, 106–110; Kerimov, D. A.: Kibernetika i pravo [Cybernetics and law]. Sovetskoe 
gosudarstvo i pravo, (1962) 11, 98–104; by Knapp, V.: O možnosti použití kybernetických metod v právu 
[On the possible uses of cybernetic methods in law]. Praha, 1963, and De l’application de la cybernétique 
au domaine du droit. Revue de Droit contemporain [Bruxelles], (1962–63) 2, 13–34; Gavrilov, O. A.: O 
vozmozhnosti ispolzovaniya metodov kibernetiki v normatvorcheskoi deyatelnosti [On the possibility of 
providing cybernetic methods in practical law-making]. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, (1965) 10, 119–
123; Benjamin, N.: Zur Anwendung mathematischer Methoden in der staatlichen Leitung und 
Rechtspfl ege. Staat und Recht, (1965) 6, 899–921; Kudryavtsev, V. N. (ed.): Voprosy kibernetiki i pravo 
[Issues of cybernetics and law]. Moscow, 1967, and Eliás, J. (ed.): Kybernetika a právo: Buletin o 
aplikaci kybernetickych metod ve vede o státu a právu a v právni praxi [Cybernetics and law: Bulletin 
on the application of cybernetic methods on the fi elds of state and law and also in legal practice]. I–. 
Praha, 1967. Later works went more in details as e.g. Kisza, A.: Model cyberneticzny powastawania i 
działania prawa [The cybernetic model of law]. Prace Wrocławskiego Towarzystwa Naukowego A/133, 
Wroclaw, 1970. and Polevoi, N. S.–Vitruk, N. V. (ed.): Osnovy primeneniya kibernetiki v pravovedenii 
[Foundations of the application of cybernetics in jurisprudence]. Moscow, 1977.
33 Ziembiński, Z.: Normy moralne a normy prawne: Zarys problematyki [Moral and legal 
norms: Outlines]. Uniwersytet im. Adama Miczkiewicza w Poznaniu: Prace Wydziału prawa 6, 
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sociological-ethnographical descriptions34 and the history of relevant ideas.35 There were 
also initiatives breaking new paths worthy of international attention, like Anita M. 
Naschitz’s attempt to found the Marxist variant of axiology and natural law36 and Maria 
Borucka Arctowa’s efforts, providing, for ever-changing law, a quasi natural-law foundation 
by defi ning life conditions in society that can be taken as minimum and optimum at the 
same time.37
Socialist Jurisprudence Recognised Internationally as an Independent Trend   
Owing to some internationally renowned prominent representatives (such as Imre Szabó, 
Viktor Knapp38 and Hermann Klenner39), Socialism’s Marxism eventually legitimated its 
existence as a trend of legal theorising acknowledged worldwide.40 However, as a counter-
balance (by marking its almost exclusive political acceptance) the Western Cold War 
practice also continued. Separated from Western Marxism, Western interest in regional 
theoretical developments remained unduly selective, in striking disrespect of the genuine 
merits of scholarly achievement. Only Soviet and ideologically biased authors could come 
into its focus. Authors like Kerimov,41 Tumanov, Nedbailo and others, or the Polish 
Academy of Sciences Institute of Law director, Adam Łopatka, the East German Karl A. 
Poznan, 1963; Studnicki, Fr.: Przepływ wiadomosći o normach prawa [New developments on legal 
norms]. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego CXIX: Prace Prawnicze 22, Kraków, 1965; 
Borucka-Arctowa, M.: O społecznym działaniu prawa [On the social effect of law]. Warszawa, 1967.
34 For example Vulcanescu, R.: Etnologie juridica [Legal ethnology]. Buçuresti, 1970; Krstić, 
D.: Pravni običaji kod Kuća [Legal customs of Kuca]. Srpska Akademiia Nauka i Umetnosti, 
Balkanoloski Institut 7, Beograd, 1979.
35 Zor’kin, V. D.: Pozitivistskaya teoriya prava v Rossii [Positivist legal theory in Russia]. 
Moscow, 1978; Piatkina, S. A. (ed.): Istoriya russkoi pravovoi mysli: Biografi i, dokumenti, publikatsii 
[The history of Russian legal thought: Biographies, documents, publications]. Moscow, 1998.
36 By Naschitz, A.: Wert und Wertungsfragen im Recht. Revue roumaine des Sciences sociales: 
Série de Sciences juridique, 9 (1965) 1, 3–23, and »Le problème du droit naturel« à la lumière de la 
philosophie marxiste du droit. Revue roumaine des Sciences sociales: Série de Sciences juridiques, 10 
(1966) 1, 19–40.
37 Borucka-Arctowa, M.: The Conception of Legal Consciousness as a New Approach to the 
Problems of Natural Law. In: Łopatka, A. (ed.): Contemporary Conceptions of Law. Warsaw, 1979. 
153–170.
38 For example Knapp, V.: Filozofi cké problémy socialistického práva [The philosophical 
problems of socialist law]. Praha, 1967. See also Knapp, V.: Legal Sciences. In: Main Trends of 
Research in the Social and Human Sciences. Paris and The Hague, 1978. part II.
39 For example by Klenner, H.: The Marxist Conception of Human Rights. Retfærd [Copenhagen], 
(1977) 6, 8–20, and Vom Recht der Natur zur Natur des Rechts. Berlin, 1984.
40 For example by Wróblewski, J.: State and Law in Marxist Theory of State and Law. Wayne 
Law Review, 22 (1976) 3, 815–839; Problems of Legality in Marxist Theory. Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie, 62 (1976), 497–515, and The Philosophical Problems of Legal Theory in Marxist 
Interpretation. Archivum Iuridicum Cracoviense, 11 (1978), 41–56.
41 With a military procurator’s past in [East-]Germany but with an ability to communicate in 
Russian exclusively, cf. e.g. Kerimov, V. A. (ed.): Pravo i kommunizm [Law and communism]. 
Moscow, 1960.
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Mollnau42 or the Bulgarian academician Popov,43 who were by no means excelling 
outstandingly, were favoured by this.
Notwithstanding all that, as to the internal development of legal theorising in the 
region, remarkable works and noteworthy contributions emerged, owing to which 
possibilities opened up for genuinely progressive strategic steps as well. Indeed, scholarly 
advancement is indicated by collections44 and journals launched in the period,45 as well as 
by individual accomplishments that soon became internationally acclaimed, like the treatise 
of Radomir D. Lukić,46 or the theoretically founded and sophisticatedly developed re-
institutionalisation of legal sociology in the Socialist orbit by Kálmán Kulcsár.47 Other 
examples include the legal philosophy that Vilmos Peschka dogma-critically developed 
from the tenets of Marxism using Hegel and Lukács as bipolar frames, or the re-introduction 
of legal comparatism with theoretical foundations and methodological outlines on its 
Socialist specifi cities,48 extended to the whole region, by Imre Szabó and Zoltán 
42 Mollnau, K. A.: Vom Aberglauben der juristischen Weltanschauung. Berlin [Ost], 1974, and 
Zur Kritik der bürgerlichen Ideologie 53, Frankfurt am Main, 1975. 
43 Popov, P. N.: Kritika na sovremenniia burzhoazen praven normativizma [Criticism of 
contemporary bourgeois legal normativism]. Sofi a, 1964.
44 From among the early festschrifts, see Vintu, I.–Naschitz, A. M.–Nestor, I. (ed.): Études 
juridiques en l’honneur du Professeur Trajan A. Ionesco. Special issue of Revue roumaine des 
Sciences sociales: Série de Sciences juridiques, 12 (1968) 1. For collections at an international level, 
cf. Archives de Philosophie du Droit 12: Marx et le droit moderne. Paris, 1967, and Reich, N.: 
Marxistische und sozialistische Rechtstheorie. Studien und Texte zur Theorie und Methodologie des 
Rechts 12, Frankfurt am Main, 1972, and at a national one, Łopatka, A.–Szklennik, A. (ed.): Law and 
Future of Society. Warsaw, 1977; Kerimow, D. (ed.): Contemporary Conceptions of Law / Die 
marxistische Konzeption des Rechts. Probleme der modernen Welt 26, Moskau, 1979.
45 For example Archivum Iuridicum Cracoviense, I– (1968–).
46 By Lukić, R. D.: Théorie de l’Etat et du droit [1951]. Philosophie du Droit 13, Paris, 1974, 
and La giustizia e l’objettività del diritto. Rivista internazionale di Filosofi a del Diritto, XLI (1964) 
VI, 679–688; as well as Lukić, R. (ed.): Sur la philosophie du droit. Beograd, 1978.
47 As to Adam Podgórecki, cf. his Załozenia polityki prawa: Metodologia pracy legislacyjnej i 
kodyfi kacyjnej [Legal policy: Methodology of legislation and codifi cation]. Warszawa, 1957, 
Socjologia prawa [Legal sociology]. Seria Sygnaly, Warszawa, 1962, Prestiż prawa [Prestige of the 
law]. Warszawa, 1966, and Zarys socjologii prawa [Outlines of legal sociology]. Warszawa, 1971, 
ending by Law and Society. International Library of Sociology, London–Boston, 1974, compelled to 
emigrate to Canada in 1977 with his wife, the sociologist Maria Lós.
48 In the Muscovite empire, re-orientation followed slowly and gradually, as started in 
Czechoslovakia. Cf. e.g. Bystrický, R.: Za marxistickou srovnávací právovĕdu [For a Marxist 
comparative jurisprudence]. Právník, (1962) 8, 625 et seq.; Boguszak, J.: K otázce tzv. srovnávací 
právovĕdy [To the question of comparative jurisprudence]. Právník, (1962) 9, 803–806; Knapp, V.: 
Verträge im tschechoslowakischen Recht (Ein Beitrag zur Rechtsvergleichung zwischen Ländern mit 
verschiedenen Gesellschaftsordnung). Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht, 27 (1962) 3, 495–518; Svoboda, M.: Jĕstĕ k marxistické srovnávací právovĕdĕ [Once 
more on a Marxist comparative jurisprudence]. Právník, (1963) 5, 388; Knapp, V.: K otázce 
socialistické srovnávací právní vĕdy [To the question of a socialist comparative science of law]. 
Právník, (1963) 5, 391–402. It was followed by Zivs, S. L.: O metode sravnitel’nogo issledovaniya v 
nauka o gosudarstve i prave [On the method of comparative research in the sciences of state and law]. 
Sovietskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, (1964) 3, 23 et seq.; Kanda, A.: Základni problémy srovnáváni 
právnich systému ruznach ekonomickych soustav [Foundational problems of comparing legal systems 
pertaining to differing economic regimes]. Právnické Studie, (1965) 4, 699–720; Chikvadze, V. M.–
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Péteri49 and–at last but not least–the historico-comparative private-law elaboration of Gyula 
Eörsi, formulating pioneering recognitions, rich in insights of a thought-provoking depth, 
testifying to an imposingly profound erudition.50
Alongside with Western Trends
An integration that may ensure the place of legal philosophising within the orbit of 
Socialism’s Marxism as one of the internationally renowned contemporary trends, each of 
them serving as the imprint of underlying cultural aspirations with the potential of equal 
representation in scholarship, may have been a great advance indeed. In addition to 
Hungary’s launch of a new school of theoretical legal thought–in which Szabó (all along 
regarded as an equal partner in science-political games) had still preserved his authority 
both formally and informally notwithstanding the fact that in legal philosophy it was 
Peschka, and in legal sociology, Kulcsár, who marked Socialism’s Marxism as a 
professional direction in law–, the accomplishments made in Poland and pre-1968 Prague 
were equally worthy of recognition.51 All this could not change the mainstream, of course. 
The political treatment of anything of Marxism in the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic was still not capable of transcending the horizons drawn by “class 
struggle” and “ideological combat” against the phenomena of “anti-Marxism”.52
Zivs, S. L.: Sravnitel’noe pravovedenie v praktike mezhdunarodnaya nautshnaya sotrudnichestva 
[Comparative jurisprudence in the practice of international scientifi c cooperation]. Sovietskoe 
gosudarstvo i pravo, (1966) 2, 12–21; Posch, M.–Petev, V.: Vergleichung in der Rechtslehre. Staat 
und Recht, (1966) 1, 89 et seq.; by Knapp, V.: Quelques problèmes méthodologiques dans la science 
du droit comparé. Revue roumaine des sciences sociales: Série de Sciences juridiques, (1967)1, 76 et 
seq. and Nĕkteré metodologické problémy srovnávací právní vĕdy. Právník, (1968) 2, 91 et seq.
49 Starting with Péteri, Z. (ed.): Studies in Jurisprudence for the Sixth International Congress of 
Comparative Law. Budapest, 1967, and Péteri, Z. (ed.): Études en droit comparé – Essays in 
Comparative Law, the Hungarian contributions to the international congresses of comparative law 
have regularly been published up to the present day. As the fi rst distinctively scholarly position of 
Socialist comparatism, see Szabó, I.–Péteri, Z. (eds): A Socialist Approach to Comparative Law. 
Budapest–Leyden, 1977.
50 Cf. Eörsi, Gy.: Comparative Civil (Private) Law: Law Types, Law Groups, the Roads of Legal 
Development. 1975 Budapest, 1979.
51 Kowalski, J.: Funkcjonalizm w prawie amerykanskim: Studium z zakresu pojecia prawa 
[Functionalism in American law]. Warszawa, 1960; Opałek, K.–Wróblewski, J.: Wspołczesna teoria i 
socjologia prawa w Stanach Zjecnoczonych Ameryki Polnocnej [Theory and sociology of law in the 
USA]. Warszawa, 1963; Kryštufek, Zd.: Historické základy právního pozitivismu [Historical outlines 
of legal positivism]. Praha, 1967; Tille, A. A.: Sotsialisticheskoe sravnitelnoe pravovedenie [The 
socialist comparative jurisprudence]. Moscow, 1975, as well as Tille, A. A.–Shvekov, G. V.: 
Sravnitel’nii metod v yuridicheskikh distsiplinakh [Comparative method in legal disciplines]. [1973] 
Moscow, 1978.
52 Tumanov, V. A. (ed.): Protiv sovremennoi pravovoi ideologii imperializma [Against 
contemporary legal imperialism]. Moscow, 1962, and Tumanov, V. A. (ed.): Protiv sovremennoi 
burzhuaznoi teorii prava [Against the contemporary bourgeois theory of law]. Moscow, 1969; as well 
as, by Tumanov, V. A.: Contemporary Anti-marxism and the Theory of Law. Soviet Law and 
Government, 8 (1969) 1, 3–20, and Contemporary Bourgeois Legal Thought: A Marxist Evaluation of 
the Basic Concepts. Theories and Critical Studies, Moscow, 1974, as well as Pensée juridique 
bourgeoise contemporaine: Appréciation marxiste des conceptions fondamentales. Moscow, 1974, 
and Bürgerliche Rechtsideologie. Berlin, 1975.
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Disintegration
Mere Epigonism
The Soviet,53 East German54 and Czechoslovakian55 legal theories were summations of 
dogmas and ideological statements in want of any genuine innovation and, therefore, 
discouraged any monographic research with new scholarly recognitions. They, thus, became 
increasingly relegated to producing text-books alone, in addition to articles published in the 
offi cial periodicals of the profession (like Советское государство и право [Sovetskoe 
gosudarstvo i pravo, Moscow], Staat und Recht [Berlin] and Právník [Prague].
Directions in Competition...
At the same time, some divisions began to mark the scene. First of all, authors independent 
of Marxism won international fame (foremost Jerzy Wróblewski, followed–to a much lesser 
extent, due to his ‘detours’ in political science–by Kazimierz Opałek and–although not 
competing with the former in productivity or ingenuity, yet remaining the most spiritually 
intact of them–Zygmunt Ziembiński), in company with survivors who had never been 
Marxists themselves as, for instance, the Moravian Ota Weinberger. Curiously enough, 
some magisterial oeuvres of Socialism’s Marxism (such as the ones by Peschka and 
Kulcsár, the Polish Stanisław Ehrlich56–with a wide reputation already in political 
sociology–and Gerhard Haney57–perhaps with less outstanding and lasting personal 
accomplishments yet standing out from the East German bloc with his unconditional 
humanism) could join the former, as entitled to equal respect. Those emerging by unfolding 
research as independent authors could also awaken international attention.58
In Parallel with »Bourgeois« Trends
Thereby, a kind of natural co-existence started to be welcome again in both international 
co-operation59 and national self-representation60–with only the Soviets, East Germans, post-
1968 Czechoslovakians, Bulgarians and Romanians remaining outside, persisting with 
53 For example as a belated recognition, Strogovich, M. S.: Judicial Law: As Subject, System, 
and Discipline. Soviet Law and Government, 19 (1981) 3, 21–35.
54 See, as one of the nonetheless most known products of East Germany, Haney, G.: Der 
materialistische Rechtsbegriff (Ein Diskussionsbeitrag). In: Festschrift für Erich Buchholz. I. Berlin, 
1987. 62–71.
55 For example Law, Culture, Science and Technology. Prague, 1987, with Cuper, J.: Types of 
Metascientifi c Refl ection in Marxist–Leninist Science of State and Law. 102–128.
56 By Ehrlich, St.: Le positivisme juridique, la sociologie du droit et les sciences politiques. 
Accademia polaccoa di scienze e lettere / Biblioteca di Roma / Conferenze 28, Wrocław, 1965, and 
Studia z teorii prawa [Studies in legal theory]. Z prac Katedry Teorii Państwa i Prawa Uniwersytetu 
Warszawskiego 4, Warszawa, 1965.
57 By Haney, G.: Sozialistisches Recht und Persönlichkeit. Berlin [Ost], 1967, and 
Sotsialisticheskoe pravo i lichnost’ [Socialist law and personality]. Moscow, 1971.
58 For example Popescu, S.: Conceptii contemporane despre drept [Contemporary conceptions 
on law]. Bucureşti, 1985.
59 For example Synthesis Philosophica [Zagreb], III (1988) 1. A special issue on Contemporary 
Philosophy of Law. 223–331.
60 See the periodical (collection-like and short-lived, on account of the early death of its 
founding editor-in-chief Jerzy Wróblewski), characterised by an expressedly Western European ideal 
of style, of Studies in the Theory and Philosophy of Law [Łódz], I–V (1986–1989).
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confrontation without critical depth.61 As a memento of Soviet imperialism, the Baltic 
countries remained a still unknown dark spot on the map of Europe. Their local literature 
could not even pass the internal Soviet borders, and their representatives were excluded 
even from Socialist internationalism.62 As to Albania, even textbooks remained unknown. 
Providing elementary information, its Tirana-based journal Drejtësia Popullore [People’s 
law] had a table of contents in French, and library research could fi nd some references–
especially to crime-prevention and vendetta–in Kosovo’s Serbian language literature.
An Own Trend
Despite any emphatically independent presence,63 the past still haunts us. Until the Cold 
War’s complete end, each step forward, independent of whether or not it was promising in 
itself, remained Janus-faced and ambivalent. For instance, the co-operative 
acknowledgement of the intellectual output of the region at once became devalued by the 
Realpolitik of a world split into two, which perceived the Soviet Union as the sole 
representative of Socialism for the Western academic community, thereby also discouraging 
exactly the creative and reformatory innovations, achieved at the price of great risk, in the 
Socialist bloc’s inner and outer peripheries, to such a degree that the issue had to be raised 
whether or not any respect could be achieved for immanent scholarly values in a world so 
politically torn apart. Or, otherwise formulated, whether or not this is the over-politicised 
and simplifying way of thinking, characteristic of great powers, that may have also 
captivated the free world’s scholarship to such a degree that this could deform it into one of 
the last buttresses of the world’s bipolar division by dedicating all their interest to the 
Soviets, leaving unnoticed achievements in Central Europe, a bloc of some one hundred 
million inhabitants.64
61 For example Radev, Ya.–Tumanov, V. (ed.): Problemy gosudarstva i prava v sovremennoi 
ideologicheskoi bor’be [Problems relating to the state and law in the contemporary ideological fi ght]. 
Sofi a–Moscow, 1983.
62 The richness of the problems covered by their literature during the Soviet period became 
cognisable only afterwards, insofar as this can be judged at all from the few hundred multiplied 
specimens of their publications in the Russian language that could, after independence was regained, 
become available in Hungarian libraries (due to my initiative and thanks to the libraries of the 
University of Tartu and the Latvian Academy of Sciences in Riga). For, during the Soviet era, neither 
the world’s richest specialised collection at the Leyden Institute of Socialist Law nor the legendarily 
richest-in-its-Baltic-profi le private library of Professor Dietrich A. Loeber [Kiel] had had reliably full 
documentation.
63 For example Ziembiński, Z. (ed.): Polish Contributions to the Theory and Philosophy of Law. 
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences and the Humanities 12, Amsterdam, 1987.
64 Until my own compilation [note 5], there was scarcely any monograph or anthology 
processing Western and so-called Eastern Marxism in one corpus. As against the previous decades’ 
clearly ideological attitudes in referring to the underlying authoritarian and totalitarian political 
scheme–mostly as “Communist” or “Soviet” in, e.g. Bodenheimer, E.: The Impasse of Soviet Legal 
Philosophy. Cornell Law Quarterly, 38 (1952) 2, 51–72.; Kelsen, H.: The Communist Theory of Law. 
New York–London, 1955; Lapenna: State and Law, and Stoyanovitch: La philosophie du droit en 
U.R.S.S. [both in note 8]; Pfaff, D.: Die Entwicklung der sowjetischen Rechtslehre. Abhandlungen der 
Bundesinstitute für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien XIX, Köln, 1968; Cerroni, U.: Il 
pensiero giuridico Sovietico. Roma, 1969–, the designations were to develop into “Marxist” and 
“Socialist” or, rarely, “Marxist–Leninist”, as in, e.g. Reich, N. (ed.): Marxistische und sozialistische 
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In Progression
The stressed discontinuity of the pre-Socialist past–and, in the Soviet Union, the total 
neglect of the academic accomplishments (in St. Petersburg, Kazan, Odessa, etc.) of the 
whole development of legal-theoretical thought in the Tsarist era prior to the Bolshevik 
revolution–with the offi cial negation of any connection (in terms of the history of ideas) 
to Western thought65 seemed fi nally to come to an end. Following more than half a 
century of almost complete disinterest in both Roman law and the Western history of 
political and legal ideas, eventually the memory of the former civilisational achievements–
with an aspiration to revive them–reappeared along with a sense of the continuity and 
scholarly cultivated preservation of the past across various historical eras.66 This had 
Rechtstheorie. Studien und Texte zur Theorie und Methodologie des Rechts 12, Frankfurt am Main, 
1972; Kühne, D.: Der marxistisch–sozialistische Rechtsbegriff: Eine kritische Stellungnahme. 
Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft 11, Berlin–München, 1985; Mazurek, P.: Marxistische 
und sozialistische Rechtstheorie. In: Kaufmann, A.–Hassemer, W. (ed.): Einführung in die 
Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart. 4th ed. Uni-Taschenbücher 593, Heidelberg, 
1985. 327–343; Troller, A.: Das Rechtsdenken aus bürgerlicher und marxistisch–leninistischer 
Perspektive. Zürich, 1986. and Petev, V.: Kritik der marxistisch–sozialistische Rechts- und 
Staatsphilosophie. Münsterische Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft 37, Berlin, 1989.
65 Just as recalling how in the history of commerce in books, the printing of pamphlets as part 
of the market of pulp literature increased the spread of French Enlightenment ideas and disseminated 
new insights, it is useful to remember that academic publishing during the Tsarist era was limited to a 
few hundred copies; the basic classics of Western thought were neither translated nor made available 
in Soviet times; and even the elementary foundations of Western philosophy were exclusively taught 
in specifi c faculties. As a result, there emerged an acutely differing civilisation in the Soviet Union, 
distinct from the Western one, both in terms of the underlying mentality and of the intellectual 
framework. The only sources for comprehension of the Western world were afforded by quite sporadic 
and disdainful references in the usual textbooks on historical materialism. Even in Hungary, very few 
of those privileged had the possibility to arrive, on the fi eld of the history of politico-legal ideas, from 
the rudimentary rejection–by, e.g. Antalffy, Gy.–Papp, I.–Popovics, B.: Lectures on the History of 
Political and Legal Thinking. Acta Universitatis Szegediensis: Acta juridica et politica, Szeged, 20 
(1973) 6–to, by Seidler, G. L.: Myśl polityczna starozytności [The political thought of the Antiquity]. 
Kraków, 1961, Myśl polityczna średniowiecza [The political thought of the Middle Ages]. Kraków, 
1961, and Doktryny prawne imperializmu [The legal doctrines of imperialism]. Kraków, 1957, and 
Lublin, 1979, attempting at a genuine (though Marxising) description, sophisticated enough to be 
withdrawn from circulation and reprinting programs rather soon.
66 Vladik Sumbatovic Nersesiants of the Institute of State and Law of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences was literally the only one in Soviet Russia for decades to cultivate jurisprudence based on 
the history of ideas, whether Western or Eastern. This took place under conditions in which Roman 
law was practically unknown and the pre-Bolshevik centuries of the history of the Russian state and 
law were referred to only occasionally, in philological studies carried out on the history of institutions 
or, let’s say, of typography. Cf., e.g. Nersesiantz, V. S.: Istoriko-pravovie issledovanixa: Problemi i 
perspektivi [Legal-historical inquiry: Problems and perspectives]. Moscow, 1982, Pravo i zakon: Iz 
istorii pravovykh uchenii [Right and law: From the history of legal teachings]. Moscow, 1983, and 
Political Thought of Ancient Greece. Moscow, 1986.
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already begun through analysis of its issues within their own environment67 as well as 
through publication of compendia synthesising the merits of past research that were 
worthy of continuation.68
Transition
Obviously, the more the motive forces of the one-time Communist political and ideological 
unifi cation, with its dictatorial superstructure’s institutional fora of control, became shaken, 
the more diverse the conditions specifi c to the countries involved became. In the diversity 
thus emerging, the desiderata listed below have turned into a common prerequisite (although 
far from being fulfi lled everywhere in a balanced manner):
– in order to substantiate a brand-new start, one is expected to exert an ideological and 
political criticism of the Communism’s anti-human tendencies,69 while outlining the 
potentialities offered by the Rule of Law;70
– in order that re-continuation of the broken past can be considered at all, it is 
necessary to survey the historical preliminaries to recent ideas71 and institutions; in the 
context of the above;
67 For example Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, 28 (1979). 
Special issue on Wert und Recht.; Ceterchi, I.–Popescu, S.: Droit et valeur. Revue roumaine des 
Sciences sociales: Série de Sciences juridiques, 28 (1984) 1. 13–20.; Nenovski, N. K.: Pravo i 
tsennost’i [Law and values]. Sofi a, 1983. and Moscow, 1987.
68 For example Knapp, V.: Teorie práva [Theory of law]. Právnické učebnice, Praha, 1995.
69 Above all, Nersesiants, V. S.: Nash put’ k pravu: ot sotsializma k tsivilizmu [Our road to law: 
From socialism to civilism]. Moscow, 1992.
70 For example Mollnau, K. A.: Sozialistischer Rechtsstaat (Versuch einer Charakterisierung). 
Neue Justiz, 43 (1989) 10, 393–397; Omel’tshenko, O. A.: Ideya pravovogo gosudarstva: Istoki, 
perspektivy, tupiki [The idea of the legal state: Sources, perspectives, topics]. Moscow, 1994; 
Nersesiants, V. S. (ed.): Preemstvennost’ i novizma v gosudarstvenno-pravovom razvitii Rossii 
[Standing and novel elements in the development of state and law in Russia]. Novoe v iuridicheskoi 
nauke i praktike, Moscow, 1996.
71 For example in Russia proper, Kuznetsov, E. A.: Filosofi ya prava v Rossii [Legal philosophy 
in Russia]. Moscow, 1989; Al’bov, A. P. et al. (ed.): Russkaya fi losofi ya prava: Filosofi ya very i 
nravstvennosti: Antologiya [Russian philosophy of law: An anthology of the philosophy of justice and 
morality]. Sankt-Peterburg, 1997; as well as Azarkin, N. M.: Istoriya yuridicheskoi mysli Rossii: Kurs 
lektsii [Lectures on the history of legal thought in Russia]. Moscow, 1999, and, as monographised, 
Il’in, I. A.: Filosofi ya prava: Nravstvennaya fi losofi ya [Philosophy of law: Moral philosophy]. 
Moscow, 1993; in Estonia, Gryazin, I. N. (ed.): Istoricheskoe v teorii prava [Historicity in legal 
theory]. Studia Iuridica (Historia et theoria) 3, Tartu, 1989, and Gryazin, I. N.–Järvelaid, P. M. (ed.): 
Vneteoreticheskie formy otrazheniya prava [Theoretical forms of legal mirroring]. Studia Iuridica 
(Historia et theoria) 5, Tartu, 1990, with a commemorative elaboration on Ilmar Tammelo (128 et 
seq.) and Vasily Ivanovitch Sinaisky (136 et seq.), as well as Järvelaid, P. (ed.): Ilmar Tammelo: 
Varased tööd (1939–1943). Eesti ōigusteaduse allikad 1, Hamburg, 1993; in Bulgaria, reimpression of 
Ganev, V.: Kurs po obshctsha teoriia na pravoto: Uvod metodologiia na pravoto [Course-book on 
general theory of law: Methodological introduction to law]. 5th ed. Sofi a, 1995; and, in Romania, 
Berceanu, B. B.: Universul juristului Mircea Djuvara [Mircea Djuvara’s legal universe]. Bucureşti, 
1995.
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– as a part of raising the issue of “what is to remain from Marxism?”72 and, under the 
circumstances of an allegedly “constitutional” (in fact, shamelessly “velvet”) 
recommencement73 (when prominent fi gures withdrew in discreet silence without facing 
their personal involvement74), some extended research ought to be carried out on the lessons 
to be drawn,75 maybe in parallel with studies on National Socialism and other forms of 20th 
century totalitarianism.76
72 For example with a dramatic cesura drawn by the transition, Klenner, H.: Was bleibt von der 
marxistischen Rechtsphilosophie? In: 15th World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy: Plenary Lectures. Göttingen, 1991. 113–131. Reprint: Neue Justiz, 45 (1991) 442–445; 
Lotze, L.: Wege und Irrwege der marxistischen Rechtstheorie. Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie, 78 (1992), 396–406, and Varga, Cs.: Introduction. In: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Marxian 
Legal Theory. [note 5.] xiii–xviii. Cf. also, by Klenner, H. Recht und Unrecht. Bibliothek dialektischer 
Grundbegriffe 12, Bielefeld, 2004. and Historisierende Rechtsphilosophie: Essays. Haufe-
Schriftenreihe zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung 21, Freiburg in Breslau, 2009. It is 
to be noted that from the German Democratic Republic, only Hermann Klenner (Berlin) and Gerhard 
Haney (Jena) had the intellectual integrity of continuing their scholarly undertakeable work. The 
afterlife of the rest is mostly unknown.
73 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: Transition to Rule of Law: On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary. 
Philosophiae Iuris, Budapest, 1995. <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/24/transition-to-
rule-of-law-on-the-democratic-transformation-in-hungary-1995/>. and Transition? To Rule of Law? 
Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice Challenged in Central and Eastern Europe. PoLíSz Series 
7, Pomáz, 2008. <http://drcsabavarga.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/varga-transition-to-rule-of-law-–-
constitutionalism-and-transitional-justice-challenged-in-central-and-eastern-europe-2008/>.
74 From the German Democratic Republic, only Hermann Klenner (Berlin) and Gerhard Haney 
(Jena) had the intellectual integrity of continuing their scholarly undertakeable work. The afterlife of 
the rest is mostly unknown.
75 For example by Tille, A. A.: Pravo absurda: Sotsialisticheskoe feodal’noe pravo [The law of 
the absurd: The socialist feudal law]. Moscow, 1992 and Sovetskii sotsialistitsheskii feodalizm: 1917–
1990 [Soviet socialist feudalism]. 2nd ed. Moscow, 2005.
76 During the last of the Austrian–Hungarian IVR Symposia we organised with Ota Weinberger 
at Graz/Leibnitz, I discussed at length with Hubert Rottleutner of the Free University of Berlin the 
whys and hows of erecting an institute specialised in carrying out such parallel investigations. The 
double standard in rejecting red/brown dictatorships has blocked, however, any progress in this 
direction.
